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relationship between the media and the Government,
extending beyond mutual tolerance or acceptance in the
interests of survival. The Board's findings of Fact make it
clear that Ms Thorne was the victim of cynical discrimination induced by sensationalist reporting. Both were
sharply highlighted and criticised by the Board, yet
neither were fully and accurately reported. Why not'?
Perhaps because the evidence revealed the Government
and the media in a compromising embrace of their own.
Self-protection required mutual support.
The Government made no criticism of the sensationalised reports of the press.release and of Ms Thorne's
subsequent comments. In return the media persisted with
its original distortions. It avoided criticising the Government by continually reporting that the 'ovtents rather
than the reports of those comments precipitated government action against Ms Thorne. It also failed to report
fully the Board's criticism of the media itself.
It is routine for the media, in one breath, to deny
subjectivity and to assert the propriety of reporting'what
the people want to hear', i.e. 'the "news" which sells

newspapers'. This implicitly claims a licence to print or
broadcast stories with little or no responsibility for the
values inherent in the content or, more significantly, in
the choice of contel. In addition, it permits little
restraint on the means by which stories are obtained.

C Simik.- denials of moral
responsibility invariablyform the
basis of defences of pragmatism..
Similar denials of moral responsibility, of an inescapable subordination to the will and opinions of the
majority, invariably form the basis of defences of pragmatism . In short, politicians and journalists condition
and feed off each other's amorality. One measure of the
extent to which this relationship is uncritically accepted is
my prediction that much of this article will he dismissed
as politically naive or passe.

The right to strike
Judy Fudge
Three recent decisions by the Suprme Court of Canada contain important lessons for those in Australia who
believe that the interests of workers may he advanced by a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in its new constitutionally entrenched role as the ultimate oracle/interpreter of
Canida's fundamental values and freedoms, has decided
that the right of workers to withdraw their labour
collectively in order to obtain better working conditions
from their employers is not a fundamental freedom
worthy of Charter of Rights protection. On 9 April 1987
the court issued three decisions, Re Public Sector
Eoiptl'ee.v Relations Act (Alberta), RI'IJDSU v Sa kaiceuwan. and PSAC v Canada, upholding, respectively:
" legislation prohibiting all Alberta public sector
employees from legally striking at any time:
" ad hoc legislation requiring Saskatchewan dairyworkers on lawful strike to return to work; and
* wage control legislation which had the effect of
extending collective agreements beyond their negotiated terms and thereby precluding federal public
servants from participating in lawful strikes.
Simply put, in the context of the present Canadian
political economy, the constitutional protection of the
'freedom of association' does not include the right to
strike. Rather, the Supreme Court said the freedom of
workers to use their strongest weapon in their dealings
with employers is a modern creation of legislation best
left to the -fine tuning and delicate balancing of the
political process. The majority view was that questions
concerning the appropriateness of banning strikes in
particular situations are not 'amenable to principled
resolution. There are no clearly correct answers to these
questions. They are ofa nature peculiarly apposite to the
functions of the legislature.'
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Perhaps this decision was not surprising in the Canadian context. Questions of collective bargaining and a
right to strike were discussed in the Parliamentary
committee considering the Charter of Rights; and the
general sense of those dehiberations was that the right to
strike was to be understood as separate and distinct from
the freedom of association. Nonetheless, the Canadian
decision should prove informative to those in other
countries who would like to believe that entrenching a bill
of rights will benefit the ordinary working person. What
is important about the Supreme Court of Canada's
decisions is not unique to the Canadian context: but
rather the very mode of argumentation employed by the
courts will be used in interpreting constitutionally protected rights and freedoms in all liberal capitalist countries, of which Australia is but one.
THE MEANING OF 'FUNDAMENTAl,
RIGHTS'
The first question to be asked in evaluating whether
entrenching a bill of rights will help working people is to
ask what such a document is meant to signify. If
anything, a bill of rights is meant to be the expression of
the shared values, the community morality, of a country.
Underwriting the legitimacy of the document is the
notion that the values it expresses are grounded in
consensus. It is this claim which requires further scrutiny.
Moreover, it is this claim that allowed the Supreme Court
in Canada to argue that, in the absence of specific
reference to the right to strike, it was unprepared to give
the definition of the freedom of association an expansive
meaning so as to include the means an association such as
a trade union would use to achieve the goal of collective
bargaining.
Legal Service Bulletin
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CONCLUSION
The iniquitous treatment received by M sThorne requires
no further comment. The facts of the case speak for
themselves.
Legal proceedings issued pursuant to legislation protective of human rights may produce at least temporary
restraint on the exercise of raw power. The more
enduring success in this case was with public exposure of
discriminatory behaviour. That success, ',owever, was
limited by inadequate media coverage. The threat of
public exposure isan important asset (and perhaps even a
raison detre) of such legislation and may be somewhat
undervalued.
In this instance, legal proceedings also provided a
small window with a limited view of the internal workings
of government. Such a view is infrequently otherwise
provided. This was, in short, one instance in which the
management of information was not entirely successful.
The irrationality of the dcision-making process revealed suggests further cause for scepticism and critical
examination of claims that political and managerial

decisions are 'rational' --economically or otherwise.
Rejection of the assumption that such decisions are or
can be value-neutral is a key step in the process of critical

examination.
The media and its relationship with government warrant similar scrutiny.
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included not only the fact of association, but the means of
obtaining the objects of the association. For them. 'the
role of association has always been vital as a means of
protecting the essential needs and interests of warking
people'. The capacity to bargain collectively, and the
freedom to strike which is a necessary condition for
achieviag that capacity, were viewed by the ChiefJustice
as essential for workers to 'overcome their vulnerability
as individuals to the strength of their employers'.

Here is where the difference between principle and
policy comes in to play. Principles are essentially uncontroversial as they depend upon a consensus shared among
the political institutions; however, the right to strike and
the modern regimes of labour relations are based on
political compromises made by elected representatives
between the opposed interests of labour and capital. The
fact that the freedom to strike in the Canadian context is
both controversial and recent (when compared with the
fundamental freedoms, such as, say, the freedom of
expression, thought or religion) was sufficient evidence
for the majority of the court to declare that the right to
strike was not a fundamental right and, hence, not
deserving of protection.
But that claim in and of itself was controversial -- as
both the dissenting decision of two members of the court
and the length of time it took the court to resolve this
dispute (almost two years elapsed from the time the
appeal was heard until the decision was handed down)
indicates. The dissentients (the Chief Justice and one
other judge) held that the freedom of association

NO CGNSENSUS ON 'FUNDAMENTAL'
VALUES
What does this dispute over the 'fundamentalness' of the
right of workers to strike tell us about the entire program
ofentrenching certain open-text ured freedoms and rights
as the means of resolving controversy over the social
consensus? It tells us that even at the highest levels of the
judiciary, where the functionaries share a remarkable
congruence of experience, training and attitudes, there is
no consensus over the composition of the fundamental
values in Canada.
Working people and owners of capital have historically disagreed, and continue to do so, about the appropriateness and the scope of the freedom to strike in any given
situation. Australian society is not much different in this
respect.
A recent Gallup poll taken one month before the
Supreme Court released its decisions on the right to
strike, indicates that Canadians are divided over the right
to strike. While, 68% of Canadians support a right to
strike, only 36% of them support the right of post office,
airline, railway and telephone workers to withdraw their
labour collectively. And support for the right to strike
depends not only on the type of worker who may exercise
the right, but also on the characteristics of the person
asked the question. Younger people are more inclined to
support the right to strike than those over 50, and union
households more strongly favour the right to strike than
non-union households.
Thus, even at a particular point in time the right to
strike does not evoke a shared response among different
groups within society. And, as we know, the right to
strike itself has been subject to the historical see-saw
battle between the courts and the legislature in the
I
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Commonwealth countries, with the courts restricting and
the politicians sometimes, not always, broadening the
scope of the permitted collective withdrawal of labour.
This battle, even as it was shaped in the courts, was
subject to constantly changing views about the legitimacy
of worker action. Why should we think there would be
any less controversy over the right to strike merely
because it was an entrenched constitutional right?

A QUESTION FOR POLITICS, NOT
LITIGATION
The problem is not that the Supreme Court of Canada
failed to give workers' freedom to strike the legitimacy
that a constitutionally protected right to strike would
have given it, but, rather, that someone thought it was
appropriate for courts to make this kind ofdecision in the
first place. As John Griffith has so eloquently argued in
rejecting the idea of entrenching a bill of rights in
England, 'the law is not and cannot be a substitute for
politics. This isa hard truth, perhaps an unpleasant truth
To
I.. require a supreme court to make certain kinds of
political decisions does not make those decisions any less
political.''
The appropriateness and scope of the right to strike in
any particular context is inherently controversial, depending on political judgments about the relative
strengths of capital and labour and where the balance of
power should lie. Even the decision of the dissentients of
the Supreme Court ofCanada who believed that the right
to strike was fundamental demonstrates the accuracy of
the latter aspect of the above proposition. In fact, the
Canadian Charter of Rights specifically states that the
rights and freedoms guaranteed therein are subject 'to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society'.
The existence of this limitation clause is, in fact, the
reason why the Chiefi ustice was prepared to find that the
freedom of association included the right to strike,
because it enabled the court to uphold certain limits to
the right to strike provision.
However, the very inquiry into what constitutes a
demonstrably justifiable limitation in a free and democratic society is itself extremely controversial. For
example, one member of the court who agreed With the
Chief Justice that the constitution protected the right to
strike, disagreed with his conclusion that legislation
ordering workers who were in a legal strike position,
where the government did not present any evidence of
harm to third parties caused by the strike, constituted a
demonstrablyjustified limitation. Even if the courts were
not required by the constitution to consider whether a
particular legislative limitation of a fundamental right or
freedom was justified, American constitutional jurisprudence has demonstrated that such considerations are
always involved. In the American constitutional context
this drawing of appropriate limits is always engaged in,
but as part of the initial definition ofthe right, rather than
as an explicit second step as in the Canadian case.
In fact, the right to strike is never absolute. Even in
countries such as France or Japan where the right to
strike is explicitly entrenched within their respective
constitutions it does not mean that the uw.e of economic
action in a particular situation is unrestrained or not
controversial. Like all constitutional rights the right to
strike is liable, and likely, to be balanced against the other
rights with which it conflicts - most notably, even when
not explicitly authorised, the right to use private property
as its owner wishes.
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A COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
What would a constitutionally entrenched right to strike
give to working people? Arguably, it would give symbolic
legitimacy to the collective withdrawal of labour by
workers in their continuing struggles for better working
conditions and standards of living. And, perhaps, it
would make governments less willing to restrain strikes in
situations where strikes have previously been seen as
legitimate. And, less likely, workers might be able to use
this right to extend their collective power in new ways. All
this will depend on the courts balancing of countervailing
rights and the 'consensus' of values at any particular
time.
If these are the benefits of entrenching a right to strike,
what are the costs? Entrenching the right to strike in a
constitutional document will shift the locus of political
debate about the scope of workers' power from democratic institutions, where working people have some voice
through the electoral process (however nominal it may
seem at times), to the courts. If we are unhappy with the
particular balance that elected representatives select, we
can withdraw our support and ask for new scales. If, on
the other hand, we are unhappywith the balance that the
supreme appelate court selects, there isnothing much we
can do but hope that in the futurea new consensus will be
revealed (by some magic) to thejudiciary. Dissatisfaction
with the political process cannot be remedied by shifting
the responsibility to resolve essentially controversial
political questions to another institution, particularly if
that institution iseven less responsive to the democratic2
process than the one we were initially dissatisfied with.
Entrenching a bill of rights will result in a massive
judicialisation of political discourse. Instead ofasking for
abstract rights which depend for their interpretation and
application in a concrete situation on an institution
designed to be beyond the influence of various interests,
the demand should be for concrete entitlements from
institutions which are accountable to the majority of
people, who, in Australia as in Canada, are working
people. Symbolic victories, where in the end control of
the larger debate is lost, are of little value. Australian
-working people owe few of their victories to the courts;
rather, they have won them by engaging directly in
political and economic struggles.
Concrete demands both to address particular situations and to achieve a vision of the future constitute the
best strategy for accountable social change. Australians
concerned about the plight of working people in a
political climate not very favourable to workers' aspirations should not put their trust in a document or
institution over which they have no control. Canadian
workers' will have to struggle to minimise the damage to
political debate caused by entrenching fundamental
freedoms. By refusing an entrenched bill of rights (even
one that contains some abstract references to their
aspirations) Australian working people can avoid this
drain on their limited resources, and channel their
struggles to win concrete victories.
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